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il cannocchiale

HARRY VAN DER LINDEN

rivista di studi filosofici
n. 1/2 - gennaio-agosto 1991

COHEN, COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY,
AND ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY

[ESTRATTO]

I

I

Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane

I

My main objective in this paper is to show that Hermann
Cohen's ethics offers an important but hitherto neglected contribution to the- current debate within Anglo-American ethics on the
moral status of the modern business corporation. This debate was
started by Peter A. French, who defends the moral collectivist
view that the corporation is a moral person and thus a subject of
moral and legal collective responsibility ascriptions that cannot be
reduced to, or translated into, ascriptions of responsibility to corporate members. One major opposing view is what may be called
the common moral individualist explanation and defense of the
status quo. According to this view, corporations as collectives can
justifiably be held 'legally' responsible but .' moral' responsibility
ascriptions (e.g., Exxon was to blame' for the huge oil spill in
Alaska) are to be understood as condensed expressions of saying
that some, not further identified, corporate members are morally
blameworthy.
Cohen's contribution to the debate between moral collectivists
and individualists is to be found in his transcendental analysis of
the notion of the legal person. His analysis shows that moral and
legal corporate responsibility ascriptions are fully justified only if
the corporation is democratically controlled by its employees. On
this basis, I will argue that French's collectivist view involves
an untenable conception of corporate moral responsibility, while
the common moral individualist explanation and defense of the
status quo fails because, among other reasons, it neglects that
some current legal sanctions against corporate wrongdoing may be
unfair to employees. My final conclusion will be that Cohen's
analysis has the critical implication that the current demand for
increased corporate responsibility should go hand in hand with the
demand for workers' self-management (Le., economic democracy). I
will begin by explaining Cohen's transcendental analysis of the notion
of the legal person. My explanation will be set forth against the
background of a synoptic discussion of Kant's impact on Cohen's
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view of the proper relation between individual and ideal collective (totality).

1. 11ldividttal and Totality

Cohen states in the beginning of his major ethical study
Ethik des reinen Willens that the concept of the human person
(Mensch) is the subject matter of his ethics. But how is this
concept to be understood? Cohen writes: «How about the human
person; is he an individual? By no means is he this alone; he
also stands as rank and file within a plurality (Mebrheit),. or
better, within many pluralities. And he is not only this; ·in the
totality (Allheit) he first completes the circle' ·of his being. And
this totality also has many degrees and levels until its completion
in a true unity, namely, in humanity, which is at the same time
an eternal new beginning» 1. Cohen adds: «This insight must
become the basic idea of the construction of our ethics ».
This basic idea indicates that Cohen's view of the proper
relation between individual and ideal collective is both indebted
to, and critical of, Kant's view concerning this matter. Like Kant,
Cohen defines the ideal collective, or totality, as a unified plurality
established through general obedience to the moral law. Or,. as
Kant himself puts it in Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals,
the final purpose of the moral law is to make possible the realm
of ends as the totality in which human agents t~eat one another
as legislators, or ends in themselves, and seek to promote .one
another's personal ends. Using the categories ·ofquantity - unity,
plurality, and totality - from the table of categorie& in Critique
of Pure Reasol1, Kant argues that the moral law is the unity,
human agents and their ends constitute the. plurality, and the
application of the unity to the plurality leads to the realm. of
ends as a unified plurality, I.e., the totality as a harmony of ends 2.

1 Ethik des l'eillel1 Willens (Hildesheim-New York, Georg alms 1981),
p. 8. Reprint of the second edition of 1907. The first edition appeared in 1904 ..
2 See Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, translated by Lewis
White Beck (Indianapolis,Bobbs-Merrill 1959), pp. 54-55. German reference,
Immanuel Kants Werke, edited by Ernst Cassirer (Berlin, Bruno Cassirer
1912-22), Vol. IV, pp. 294-295.
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Furthermore, Cohen follows Kant in holding that the individual
who takes his own particularity, or that of the group he is part
of, as the sole guide of his moral decision-making cannot come to
truly moral actions: to «complete the circle of his being », to
be autonomous, the individual must make the realm of ends, or
a unified humanity as the highest level of the totality, the mirror
and goal of his willing and actions. Thus both Cohen and Kant
view autonomy as setting a task whose ultimate completion requires
the realization of ideal humanity. Moreover, they both see this
task as infinite: In Cohen's terms, ideal humanity is both the
aim and « eternal new beginning» of truly moral actions.
Opposing the totalitarian view that the collective is more
important than the individual, Cohen emphasizes that «every community has the purpose of creating the true individual, for this
individual can arise only from a real, healthy, and developed community; that this individual be created is, and remains, the true
goal of all formations of communities» 3. Cohen also implicitly
rejects here the traditional liberal view that the community, no. tably, the state, is a mere instrument for the realization of individual purposes. In a sense, Cohen's criticism also applies to Kant.
To be sure, Kant views the demo<:ratic state not as a mere means
for enabling the pursuit of private ends ·within civil society (as
the liberal tends to argue) but rather as an institutional precondition for the emergence of the realm of ends 4• Yet, Kant sees
the realm of ends itself as a mere ideational or inner union of
good wills (the «true church» as invisible church), and in this
regard he shares the liberal's mistake of failing to recognize that
institutional participation is an essential aspect of moral emanci-

3 See Einleitung mit kritischem Nachtrag zu Langes Geschichte des Matedalismus, in COHEN, Schl'iften zur Philosophie und Zeitgeschichte, Vol. II,
. edited by Albert GOtland and Ernst Cassirer (Berlin, Akademie 1928), p. 272.
Reprinted from the 9th edition of LANGE'S Geschicbte des Matel'ialismus.
4 One reason that Kant offers for this latter view is that the rule of
law guarantees' external freedom for all, and thus reduces immorality triggered
by the threat posed by others. See Perpetual Peace, translated by Lewis
White Beck in KANT, On History, edited by Beck (Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill
1963), p. 123 n. German reference, Immanuel Kants Werke, Vol. VI, pp.
462-463 n. It may also be noted that the rule of law upholds freedom of
speech as a necessary precondition for moral decision-making. Cf. note 8,
below.
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pation. Cohen, to the contrary, stresses the latter point 5, ·and argues
that all our economic, social, and political institutions must instantiate the ideal of the realm of ends -'- that is, existing pluralities
must be transformed into totalities. We can find a certain institutional alienation in Kant's work in that he maintains that morality
cannot really -become visible in the social world, whereas Cohen
~rgues th~t the continuous moral improvement of the legal system
is the ultImate r·ationale of the moral law (ethics) 6.
Two additional, but related, differences between Cohen and
Kant must be mentioned. First, Cohen stresses to a crreater degree
the social n~tu~e. of individuals, both metaphysicall/ and morally.
For Cohen, mdividuals are to be seen as individuals-in-relations in
that they are defined by, but also define, social'relations, while
~ant has n?t yet completely k# behind, the conception of indiViduals as isolated egos whose relations are external to them 7.
Correspondingly, Cohen views the ideal moral agent as a 'colegislator', as a person who arrives at moral truth in communication
with others, whereas Kant tends to see the ideal moral agent as
~ 'legis.lator', as. an individual who determines duty through an
mner .dialogue wlth the moral law 8. Likewise, Cohen pays' 'more
attentlon to the fact that collective moral praxis rather than in<

5 See, for example, Das allgemeine, gleiche und direkte' Wahlrecht in
Schriften xur Philosophie und Zeitgeschichte, Vol II,' pp. 333-334. C~hen
states here that it is a fundamental mistake to hold that moral emancipation
~an be rea~ed :without political participation, adding that the right to vote
IS «the preCIse Instrument for the moral education of the people ».
,
6 Cf. S. S. SCHWARZSCHILD, Introduction to Ethik des rein en Willens, p. xv.
7 For a furthe~ d!scussion of similar conflicting «social ontologies», see
C. C. GOULD, Rethtnktng Democracy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
1988), Chapter 2. ,
8 It would be a mistake, however, to describe Kant's ethics as a mere
monological ethics. This common mistake is made, for example, by ]Urgen
Habermas. Kant recognized the importance of dialogue for any critical thought
in What is Orientation in Thinking? In response to the claim that the
go~ernment can take away freedom of' speech but never the freedom to
~hmk, K.ant wrote.: «But. how much, and how correctly, would, we think
if we dId not thmk as It were in common with others with ,,,hom we
mutually communicate! ». See KANT, Critique of Practical Reason' and Other
\Vr!ting~ in Mor~l Philosophy, translated by' Lewis White Beck (Chicago,
Umverslty of Chicago Press 1949), p. 303. German reference Immanuel
Kant~ Werke, Vol. IV, p. 363. For a further discussion of this is'sue, see my
Kant/an Ethics and Socialism (Indianapolis, Hackett' 1988), pp. 35-37.
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dividual moral action is the vehicle of fundamental moral and
historical progress 9. Second, Cohen adheres to the Platonic methodological view that the explication of the ideal collective subject
should be the basis for expounding the ideal individual subject
and her moral law 10. Kant traverses the opposite road in Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, explicating the moral law
on ,the basis of our sense of duty and then deriving the ideal
of i:he realm of ends from the moral law.
The various similarities and differences between Cohen's and
Kant's accounts. of the proper relation between individual and
totality are highlighted in Cohen's transcendental analysis of the
notion of the legal person. The main idea of this analysis is that
the notion of the legal person can function as a model for the
totality and that in analyzing the rational presuppositions of this
notion' we can explicate - and justify - the totality, and with
it the moral law and the ideal individual moral subject.
The basic steps of Cohen's transcendental analysis of the legal
person may be reconstructed as follows. The producer cooperative
(<< Genossenschaft ») offers the best example of the notion of the
legal person, and the creation of this cooperative as legal person
presupposes that the divided wills of a mere plurality are transformed into a unified will, as expressed in the charter and by-laws
of the cooperative. In the words of Cohen: «[The] legal action
[of becoming a cooperative] is formed through the decision [ ... ].
The decision is the unification of individual wills into a unified
will. This unified will does not belong to any of the individual
wills; it is a common will (Gesamtwille) [. .. ]. From the legal
point of view, it is said that this common will does not represent
the sum of the still existing wills but that it annihilates these and
puts itself in their place. Nonetheless, this representative will is

9 Cf. L. GOLDMANN, Immanuel Kant, translated by Robert Black (London,
New Left Books 1971), pp. 172 and 178. Goldmann notes that the individual as such rather than the group is emphasized in Kant and that the
effect of this ,neglect of collective praxis is that the prospect of fundamental
social change is darkened. This point, however, should not be stressed too
far: after all, Kant saw the French Revolution as a sign of moral and
historical progress. For Cohen's view, see, for example, Ethik des reinen
Willens, p. 328, where Cohen describes revolutions as «periods of experimental ethics ».
10 See Ethik des reinen Willens, pp. 7 and 14 .
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the true real will [. .. ]. This representative unified ideal will forms
the unity of intention and the unity of the person - the concept
of the legal person» 11. Now since the cooperative as legal person
displays a unified will and thus is a harmony of ends it' can
function as a model 'for the ideal of the' totality. Furthermore,
the cont~uation of the cooperative as (unified' person requires
that all 1ts members have the right to vote and actively: exercise
this right so as to arrive at cooperative policies and actions that
are acceptable to all and accord with the charter and by-laws of
the cooperative. Accordingly, the transcendental conditions of the
cooperative as legal person explicate the: ideal of' 'the 'totality as a
thoroughly democratic ideal, and this means that other instantiations of the totality, such as the ideal state, i must be described
in similar terms. Cohen writes: «The state is also a person. Only
as a person has it unity [ ... ]. The person, of the state must be
based on the will of the state [. .. J. The right to vote is the
fundamental right in which the will of the state originates» 12.
Another aspect of Cohen's transcendental analysis is that both the
ideal moral subject and the moral law are explicated: the moral
law as the constitutive principle of the totality demands that all
our actions be consistent with, or mirror, the totality, and' this
means, most importantly, that we must become colegislators of
the institutions in which we function and that we mnst recognize
other participants as co determiners of the policies and .actions of these
institutions. Finally, the conclusion follows that since existing economic, social, and political institutions are treated as legal persons,
these institutions must become totalities, or thoroughly democratic
institutions.
r

2. Collective Responsibility and Economic Democracy
French's contention that the modern business corporation
should be seen as a moral person and, hence, as a subject of
collective responsibility ascriptions, poses a clear challenge to
Cohen's transcendental analysis of the legal person. The upshot
of Cohen's transcendental analysis is that any formally organized
11

12

Ibid., p. 231.
See Das allgemeine, gleiche U11d direkte Wahlrecht,' p. 332,
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group, such as the corporation, should be conceived as moral/legal
person, and thus as fully appropriate subject of collective responsibility ascriptions, only if its will-formation is the result of a thoroughly democratic process. Now since the modern corporation
lacks such a democratic process, French's contention that the corporation is a moral person puts into question Cohen's attempt to
normatively ground the demand for economic democracy on the
basis of his analysis of the legal person. Why is it the case that
the producer cooperative rather than the modern business corporation instantiates the notion of a formally organized collective
as moral/legal person?
;r
In order to answer this question, we must examine French's
theory of the corporation as moral person. His theory is motivated
by ,the view that corporate harm is typically a question not of
individual 'moral responsibility, but of collective responsibility.
In his detailed analysis of a well-known case of corporate harmMc Doimell-Douglas' ,use of poor-functioning cargo doors on its
DC-lO's;which led to a plane crash in Paris in 1974, killing all
346 passengers aboard - , French points out that it is very difficult
to: identify corporate members who can be held morally responsible
for this crash. Some factory inspectors had been negligent, but,
French argues, «it would be a grand offense to our moral intuitions, in the absence of any evidence of intentional sabotage, etc.,
to hold those inspectors primarily responsible for the crash of ship
29 [the DC-10 that crashed] »13. Thus French concludes: «The
aggregate· of justifiable individual responsibilities for the production of ship 29 simply does not add up to an individual's responsibility for its crash. Without a theory of the corporation as a moral
person upon which to base [ ... ] accountability ascriptions [. .. J
the real villain of the piece will escape moral detection. [. .. ] The
theory of the corporation as' a moral person is intended [to
bring] the corporate giants [ ... ] into the scope of morality» 14.
On French's account, then, we must conceive the corporation as a
moral person; for only in this way can moral responsibility for

13 Collective and Corporate Responsibility (New York, Columbia University Press 1984), p. 141. French offers an earlier defense of his theory of
the corporation as moral persons in The Corporatioll as a Moral Person,
«American Philosophical Quarterly», XVI (July 1979), pp. 207-215:
14 Collective and Corporate Responsibility, p. 144.
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corporate harm be placed where it typically primarily should be
placed - on the corporation itself.
French holds that what needs to be shown for the corporation to be a moral person is that the corporation can bean intentional actor. Obviously, the corporation can act only through the
actions of its members, and so the task at hand is to show how their
actions can justifiably be described as the intentional act{s) of the
corporation. French claims that a Corporation's Internal Decision
Structure (CID Structure) makes such a description possible. In
his own words, the relevant aspects of the CID Structure are
« (1) an organizational or responsibility flowchart that delineates
stations and levels within the corporate power . structure and (2)
corporate-decision recognition rule(s) (usually embedded in something called corporate policy)>> 15. Now the individual decisions
made at the top of the typically hierarchical responsibility flowchart - such as the voting by the board of directors of a corporation -lead to a corporate act. And, French argues" this corporate act can justifiably be described as an 'intentional' corporate act when it accords with the policy of the corporation. He
states: «[W]hen the corporate act is consistent with an instantiation or an implementation of established corporate policy, then it
is proper to describe it as having been done for corporate reasons,
as having been caused by a corporate desire coupled with a corporate belief and so, in other words, as corporate intentional» 16.
Emphasizing that the reasons ,desire, and belief of the corporation
may but need not be identical to the reasons,' desire" and belief
that guided the different· individual decision-makers within the
corporation, French concludes that' corporations have «metaphysical status », i.e., they are «intentional' actors in their own right
and [. .. ] thereby full-fledged moral persons» 17.
French's analysis is at first sight attractive' because 'it makes
intelligible and justifiable many common moral and legal practices,
such as blaming corporations for producing dangerous consumer
goods, praising corporations for being community minded, and
imposing legal fines on corporations for the violation of anti-pollution laws. In short, these practices may be seen as an extension
15

16

17

1

Ibid., p. 4l.
Ibid., p. 44.
Ibid., p. 47.
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of the practices of blaming, praising, and punishing biological persons, governed by the same moral principles but applied to the
corporate person. I believe, however, that French's theory of the
corporation as moral person is untenable.
The basic problem with this theory is to be found in its
account of the will-formation of the corporation. French is correct
in claiming that a decision made' in the corporate board room
need not be in accordance with the 'initial' intentions of the
corporate executives, but he wrongly infers that this means that
the corporation is an. actor with its own intentions as distinct
from the corporate executives and their intentions. Instead,' we
should say that the corporate executives through deliberation and
voting transform their initial intentions into a common intention,
assuming that they recognize the CID Structure as legitimate 18.
Here Cohen's transcendental analysis 6f the notion of the legal
person is instructive. Cohen holds that through the democratic
decision procedure of the cooperative, a common will is formulated,
and that this will puts itself in the place of the initial wills of
the cooperative. Yet, Cohen does not contend that this common
will is separate from the wills of the members of the cooperative
(as French would argue); rather, ,this will is ideally the will of
each member of the cooperative after the democratic decision has
taken place. Roughly speaking, the distinction between initial will
and common will parallels Kant's distinction between the will of
the inclinations, the particular will, and the will of moral reason,
the universal will. It is through the categorical imperative as decision procedure that one's particular will is transformed into, or
made consistent with, a moral or universal will. Likewise, it is
through deliberation and voting within the cooperative that the
particular or initial wills of the members of the cooperative are
transformed into a common will. But just as it is a mistake to
claim that moral reason is an intentional actor in its own right,
as distinct from the individual agent, it is a mistake to argue that
the, cooperative or corporation is an intentional actor in its own
right as distinct from the biological individuals who make up the
cooperative or corporation.

18 Cf. L. MAy, The Morality of Groups (Notre Dame, University of
Notre Dame Press 1987), pp. 69-70.
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Fre)lch's view that the corporate will is somehow distinct from
the wills of corporate executives is reflected in his understanding
of corporate responsibility as a form of collective responsibility
that is altogether separate from the responsibilities of corporate
individuals. Thus French maintains that the total responsibility
for the Paris air disaster is a combination of collective responsibility
(i.e., the responsibility of tbe corporation as moral person) and the
responsibilities of individuals, emphasizing tbe· role of collective
responsibility. In my view (and Cohen's), collective responsibility
is completely distributive over persons. In other words, collective
responsibility can be analyzed in terms of the responsibility of
individuals, in that it is a shared responsibility of individuals who
are engaged in a cooperative enterprise, having a common intention or unified will.
One problem with French's non-distributive conception of
collective responsibility is that it is doubtful whether this very
idea is intelligible. As the American ethicist Susan Wolf notes:
«When you have put all the members of an organization to one
side, all you have left is a set of abstract relations, a structural
scheme, a conceptual flow chart. How can a flow chart be guilty?
It seems that either evil lurks in the hearts of men and ·women,
or it lurks nowhere at all» 19. Another problem with· French's
conception of corporate responsibility is that it invites the abdication of individual responsibility: the corporate moral person becomes the scapegoat behind wbich the dirty hands of corporate
executives are hidden. And a final problem with his conception is
that it makes collective responsibility ascriptions rather pointless.
One major function of these ascriptions in connection with such
responses as blame and praise is to change and improve collective
practices. But this can be effected only if individuals consider
themselves to be responsible for these practices and, hence, view
collective responsibility ascriptions as distributive. In French's universe, then, we may be left with perpetually ashamed corporations,
because no one feels called upon to change their immoral behavior 20.

We now can turn to the heart of the matter: French's separation of the corporate moral person and corporate responsibility
from corporate members and their responsibilities reflects the fact
that the corporation lacks a thoroughly democratic decision procedure. We are not justified in claiming that the corporation is
collectively responsible - in the sense of its members having a
shared responsibility - for corporate harm, for the actions of the
corporation are not determined by all its members. Notably, production workers usually do not share the responsibility for harmful industrial. policies, because they generally are systematically
excluded from shaping these policies and often are not aware of
these policies in the first place. Even the responsibility of corporate executives may be limited in that the ultimate effects of
their decisions may be unclear to them due to the hierarchical
CID Structure (i.e., there is an enormous gap between decision
and execution). Also, it is understandable, though not entirely
excusable, that lower-level managers at times ignore the harmful
effects of decisions they make in accordance with corporate policy,
passing the responsibility for those effects to higher-level managers.
Last, the responsibility of stockholders as such seems, in general,
confined by the fact that they have limited direct influence on
shaping corporate policy. In short, it seems then that the responsibility for corporate harm often cannot be ascribed completely to
the wrong-doing of corporate members. Thus, holding on to the
claim that the responsibility for corporate harm must somehow
be placed on the corporation, it is not surprising that French
arrives at the view that this responsibility must be placed on a
person distinct from the members of the corporation, i.e., the
corporation as moral person.'
On the basis of these observations, several conclusions can be
drawn. First, the undemocratic and hierarchical structure of the
modern business corporation is a significant cause of corporate
harm. Production workers may unwittingly bring about such harm
due to their lack of information. Moreover, in those cases in

See Tbe Legal and Moral Responsibility 0/ Organizations, «Nomos
XXVII, Criminal Justice », New York, New York University Press 1985,
p.273.
20 My remark here is partly a quip on French's punishment proposal
that corporations engaged in illegal conduct should be put to shame by the

forced publication of their misdeeds. See Collective and Corporate Responsibility, Chapter 14. It may also be noted that although French himself warns
against an organistic understanding of the corporation (see ibid., chapter 7),
his punishment proposal shows that his theory of the corporation as moral
person invites such an understanding. There is no need to repeat here the
well-known pitfalls of organistic approaches to institutions.

19
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not show that Cohen is mistaken in holding that the cooperative
rather than the corporation instantiates the notion of a formal group
as moral/legal person-at least, ona tenable interpretation of
this notion. After all, we have seen that since the corporation
lacks economic democracy, French is led to a wrong-headed separation of the corporation as moral person from the corporate members
and thus to an implausible and ineffective conception of corporate
.responsibility. Or, to put it otherwise, French hypostatizes the
idea of a formal collective as moral person, and he is brought to
this mistake because the corporation is not a totality· but rather
a plurality, or a collective with a divided will. Accordingly, we
can underscore Cohen's claim that the cooperative but not the
corporation is a moral person in the sense of being a formal group
with a unified collective will. Moreover, we can conclude that
collective responsibility ascriptions in the meaning of ascriptions
of shared responsibility are justified with regard to the corporation only if it is transformed into a democratic enterprise or
coopera tive.
This latter conclusion may seem to have little critical import;
for it might be argued, as one of French's moral individualist
critics has done 22, that the practice of blaming or praising the
torporation is merely to be understood as a condensed wlly of
saying that some corporate members are to be blamed or praised,
namely, those who are morally responsible for the harmful or
beneficial results in question. We engage then in this manner
of· speech because we are not able, or not willing, to identify the
blameworthy or praiseworthy corporate members. Moreover, it
might be argued that the legal practices of imposing fines on corporations and enforcing compensation for corporate harm do not
presuppose collective moral responsibility ascriptions; rather, these
practices are based on considerations of causal responsibility, risk
distribution, the ability to pay, and the like 23. In short, it might
be conceded that Cohen is right in claiming that corporations are
not moral persons, but that this claim is not disconcerting because
we do not treat corporations as such.

which production workers are aware that they are bringing about
harm, they may not be able to prevent further harm because they
lack the power to do so or may fear the consequences of their
protest, if it is not already the case that their lack of control has
fostered an attitude of moral indifference. Further, the CID
Structure promotes an attitude of passing the responsibility for
harm to higher levels, and those who have the decision power
may not be aware of the ultimate effects of their decisions .. Second,
those persons who willingly and knowingly support the CID
Structure are partly responsible for corporate harm, irrespective
of whether they themselves have been negligent in specific cases.
Third, it seems that this idea of structural or institutional responsibility captures the rational core of French's contention that, in
general, the moral blame for corporate harm must be placed primarily on the corporation as moral person. Fourth, Cohen and
French ultimately develop altogether different approaches to the
issue of collective organizational responsibility. We may interpret
them as both starting with the question of what the conditions
are under which responsibility can be justifiably ascribed to a
formal group. Cohen's answer is a radical contractarian one: we
are justified in holding an organized group morally responsible for
its actions only if its actions are based on the consent of all the
participants. In other words, on Cohen's account, we may conceive an organization as a moral person only if the organization
can continuously be thought of as originating in a social contract 21.
French, to the cOhtrary, offers a metaphysical agency approach to
collective organizational responsibility: it is only when a group
can be described as an intentional agent distinct from its members
that we may hold the group as such responsible for its actions.
Fifth, French's analysis of the modern business corporation does

21 Two recent works have developed a social contract approach to
business organizations: T. DONALDSON'S Corporations and Morality (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall 1982) and M. KEELEY'S A Social-Contract Theory
of Organizations (Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press 1988). Keeley
offers the more detailed argument. Why Cohen arrives at a more radical
conception of legitimate organizations on the basis of the social contract
approach than either Donaldson or Keeley is an interesting and important
question that falls outside the scope of this paper. That Cohen indeed offers a
social contract approach is argued in some more detail in E. WINTER, Ethik
find Rechtswissenschaft (Berlin, Duncker & Humblot 1980), pp. 282 ff.
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22 M. G. VELASQUEZ, Why COI·porations Are Not Responsible for Anything They Do, «Business and Professional Ethics Journal », II (Spring
1983), p. 13.
23 See ibid., pp. 13-14.
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Although I believe that this brief moral individualist explanation and defense of our present practices of holding corporations
morally and legally responsible has its merits, I also believe that it
offers a too easy legitimation of these practices. In my view, this
common moral individualist defense of the status quo is ultimately
unsatisfactory in itself, and also fails as a possible critique of Cohen.
A first problem with this defense is that it overlooks what I have
earlier called « structural or institutional responsibility». The moral
individualist view' is correct in that moral responsibility can only
meaningfully be ascribed to individuals, but this does not imply
that corporate members are responsible only for the tasks defined
by their positions. The common individualist account of moral
responsibility for corporate harm is too narrow in that it tends
to focus on negligent or knowingly harmful actions. What it' ignores is that even if one has not directly caused a particular corporate harm one may still share the blame for this harm because
one supports or actively participates within the kind of institution
that is likely to cause such harm 24. Another problem with the
moral individualist defense of the status quo is that the practice
of blaming corporations for harmful industrial policies may induce
shame and moral dissatisfaction among production workers, even
though they may not be morally responsible for these harmful
policies. After all, people often identify with the institutions in
which they participate, whether or not they have the option to
shape the policies of these institutions 25. A third problem is that
since the legal practices of imposing fines on corporations' and
seeking compensation from corporations, as well as such moral
practices as economically boycotting companies with harmful industrial policies, are directed against corporations as a whole, they
may quite well have the greatest negative effect on precisely those
who are least morally responsible: the workers who have been
fired due to the worsened financial position of their companies 26.
For a further discussion of this notion of responsibility, see T. R.
FLYNN, Sm'lre and Marxist Existentialism: The Test Case of Collective Resp01lsibility (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press 1984), pp. 124 ff.
25 Cf. W. H. WALSH, Pride, Shame and Responsibility, «The Philosophical Quarterly», XX (January 1970).
26 My point here is, of course, not to argue that economic boycotts of
corporations with immoral industrial policies are morally wrong. Rather,
I seek to support the critical nature of Cohen's transcendental analysis by
24

I

359

Both these last two problems have a common denominator: we
cannot help but view or treat the corporation in some instances
as if it were a moral person or unified plurality, but since the
conditions for doing so are in fact lacking, we commit the injustice
of harming those who are blameless. Clearly, the transformation
of the corporation into a cooperative solves this moral dilemma.
As a final response to the claim that Cohen's transcendental
analysis of the legal person' has little critical import, it should be
noted that it is only 'one' purpose of this analysis to bring to
our attention that the cooperative solves some moral dilemmas that
pertain to our present practices of holding corporations as such
morally and legally accountable for their actions. We may see
Cohen's analysis as having the more important purpose of setting
forth conditions under which economic institutions will be more
'responsible than they are at present." In conclusion, I wish to
point out some reasons why the cooperative economy, thanks to
its economic democracy, will reduce the occurrence of economic
harm as compared to our present corporate economy. Obviously,
these reasons are also grounds for holding that the current demand
·for increased corporate responsibility should be linked to the demand
for increased democracy within the workplace.
We have noted that the undemocratic hierarchical CID Structure is a significant cause of economic harm in that it promotes
moral indifference and an attitude of passing responsibility for
harm to higher levels. Now since within the cooperative everyone
has some decision power, we may anticipate a much stronger sense
of moral responsibility Z7. It will also be less likely that within
the cooperative one will pass responsibility for economic harm to
others, for at least the determination of the general industrial policy
of one's firm will be everyone's responsibility. Moreover, democracy within the workplace will make it less probable that econoting that there is an inconsistency between our treatment of corporations
as legal and moral persons and the fact that most people who make up the
corporation lack a voice in determining its policies. I hold that economic
boycotts are justified because the importance of changing harmful industrial
,policies will typically outweigh the possible harm done to workers of targeted
companies. Also, boycotts can be supplemented by various forms of support
for, these workers.
'
,."',, Z7 Cf. R.A. DAHL, A Preface to Economic Democracy (Berkeley, University of California Press 1985), pp. 98-99.
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nomic harm will result from the fact that the decision makers
were not aware of the impact of their decisions. After all, the
gap between decision and execution will be much smaller in the
cooperative. Furthermore, the interests of the decision makers
within the cooperative,' the workers, rather than the interests of
the decision makers within the corporation, the corporate executives, are representative of the interests of most consumers as the
common victims of economic harm. Thus we may expect that economic democracy will lead to a reduction of economic harm because
workers as the decision makers will be more susceptible to the
significance of economic harm, and because they are more likely
than corporate executives to be themselves victims of such harm 28.
Last, we may assume that once workers control their firms they will
opt for performing a greater variety of tasks during their working
day 29. Thus workers will become familiar with more aspects of the
industrial process and increase their technological knowledge. We
may expect that this will go hand' in hand with an increased
awareness of the toll of modern industry on both human well-being
and on the environment. Economic democracy makes it possible
that this increased awareness of economic harm is translated into
improved industrial practices.

Cf. ibid., p. 100.
Cohen himself argues for the overcoming of the division of labor in
Ethik des reinen Willens, p. 607. Moreover, Cohen maintains that workers
should become concerned with science for the sake of «truthfulness» (the
disposition to unite moral and causal laws). See ibid., p. 506. For a more
detailed discussion, see my Kantian Ethics and Socialism, pp. 229-231.
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